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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the privacy debate during the last century focused on
the need for procedural safeguards restricting the government's
ability to monitor the personal lives of its citizens. The mistrust of
"Big Brother" is grounded in a legitimate concern that government
officials may abuse their power by indiscriminately gathering and
using information about citizens. In response to these concerns,
the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy un-
der the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and held certain meth-
ods of wiretapping and searches unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. Like many states, Congress enacted laws that made it
illegal for government employees to misuse tax records or acquire
bank account information without specific authorization.
However, legal protections concerning privacy invasions by
government typically have not been extended to the collection and
use of data about individuals by private entities. Financial institu-
1458 [Vol. 27:3
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tions and other companies routinely buy and sell sensitive, personal
information to target specific consumers who are identified as "sus-
ceptible" to their solicitations. On average, companies trade and
transfer personal information about every U.S. citizen every five
seconds.' Accordingly, it is not surprising that the number of pri-
vacy violations by commercial interests has grown exponentially in
the last decade.
Part II of this Article discusses the origins of the right to pri-
vacy as a property right and a liberty right. Part III provides back-
ground information on the data-collection industry and the pub-
lic's expectations for privacy. Part IV discusses the societal harm
that can occur when an individual's privacy is violated. Part V sets
forth the public policy reasons that support adoption of an opt-in
system for sensitive personal information. Finally, the Conclusion
advocates for the provision of express consent before sensitive per-
sonal information is bought, sold or traded by commercial inter-
ests.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
Corporate lobbyists who oppose any recognition of the right to
privacy for bank records, telephone records, and other sensitive,
personal information mistakenly argue that the right to privacy is
simply an overreaction by people not wanting to be bothered by
telemarketing calls. However, the privacy issue is not simply about
freedom from "annoyance." The right to privacy is deeply imbed-
ded in American law and is reflected in virtually all contributing
cultures to the American lifestyle. There are numerous references
in the law to the right of privacy. Some of these laws and court de-
cisions reflect a personal right to privacy similar to that of freedom
of association, speech, or religion. Other laws and court decisions
reflect a property right to privacy. Part B of this section considers
the origins of the right to privacy. To put these philosophical un-
derpinnings in perspective however, Part A sets forth a hypothetical
of events which, while seemingly remote, could readily occur in to-
day's "information age."
1. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and In-
ternational Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 2
(2000).
14592001]
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A. What Privacy Means In Today's World
Mary is thirty years old and is about to graduate with a master's
degree in engineering. As a teenager Mary was treated by a psy-
chologist for anorexia. Mary recently married James, a thirty-five-
year-old attorney who is employed by Alpha Biosource's patent de-
partment. James partied heavily in college and went through
chemical dependency treatment. He has not had a drink in over
thirteen years.
Mary wants to undergo elective surgery to correct a cosmetic
problem, and Mary and James apply for a $10,000 home equity
loan from Beta Bank to pay for the surgery. Beta Bank owns Delta
Insurance Company, which provides health insurance to Alpha
Biosource. As part of the underwriting process to verify the pur-
pose of the loan, Beta Bank obtains a medical waiver from Mary.
Beta Bank receives Mary's data file from a medical bureau, which
states that Mary has been treated for mental illness. It also receives
a data file from Delta Insurance, which insures Mary through
James' group coverage at Alpha Biosource. The data file indicates
that James has been treated for chemical dependency. Beta Bank,
which has an internal policy concerning the relationship of mental
illness to credit reliability, denies the loan application, telling Mary
that its decision was based only on "underwriting reasons."
Because Alpha Biosource is engaged in the highly competitive
medical technology field, it is highly concerned about corporate
espionage. It periodically runs security checks on all of its employ-
ees, which are carried out through a blanket authorization signed
by employees when they accept employment. Alpha Biosource pre-
sents a data request to Beta Bank, which transmits a data file indi-
cating that James has been treated for chemical dependency, that
his wife has been treated for mental illness, and that their recent
application for a loan for the purpose of securing medical treat-
ment was denied. Alpha Biosource then purchases from the tele-
phone company a list of all telephone calls made by James' house-
hold over the past six months. Unbeknownst to Alpha Biosource,
Mary had been applying forjobs at a variety of different companies,
including a company that engaged in the construction of hospitals,
named XI Health Systems. When Alpha Biosource reviewed the
telephone numbers called by James' telephone, it discovered a
telephone call to XI Health Systems, which acts as a competitor to
some products distributed by Alpha Biosource. Concerned about
the blackmail of its employees, Alpha Biosource terminates James
1460 [Vol. 27:3
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due to a "corporate reorganization."
Mary then applies for employment with Gamma Transporta-
tion Systems, a company engaged in the manufacturing of high-
speed unit trains. Gamma Transportation is heavily involved in in-
ternational trade, supports the World Trade Organization, and
demands strong loyalty on behalf of its employees. Gamma Trans-
portation, as part of its hiring policy, contacts Boomerang Data In-
ternational, a company that specializes in the purchase, merging,
storing and distribution of data files. Boomerang Data periodically
sweeps the banking industry for data files. Boomerang Data re-
sponds to Gamma's request about Mary by supplying a data file
which indicates that Mary has been treated for mental illness, that
she is married to James, that James has been treated for chemical
dependency, that James was recently separated from employment
for unknown reasons, that Mary was denied a loan to pay for health
treatment, and that a check had been written on their bank ac-
count to an organization which participated in demonstrations
against the World Trade Organization. Gamma Transportation po-
litely denies Mary'sjob application.
Card Shark International is a Visa card vendor that finances its
accounts through securitized loans in the secondary market. Card
Shark obtains customers by telemarketing prospects. The names of
the prospects are obtained by purchasing data from organizations
such as Boomerang Data, which lists the names of all depositors of
particular banks who have a high monthly balance of $4000 for ten
of the past twelve months and who have not had a negative balance
during ten of the past twelve months. Card Shark telemarketers
contact Mary, who is offered a credit card. The telemarketer tells
Mary that he will send her a Visa card with no membership fee and
two-percent interest rate for the first six months. The telemarketer
also solicits Mary to receive a thirty day membership in a health dis-
count program where patients could receive a steep discount on
health care services purchased through a preferred provider net-
work. The telemarketer tells Mary that he will mail to her the list of
the health discount program, and that she has thirty days in which
to decide whether to participate. At no time was Mary advised that
if she did not affirmatively decline the program within thirty days,
she would be charged $59.95 per month for one year of service.
Mary, thereafter, receives the Visa card and starts using it to
tide the family over during the family's period of unemployment.
In a separate package she receives the materials on the health dis-
2001]
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count program, but when she reviews the list of health providers,
she discovers that only five providers reside in her state and that
none of the providers offer services that she is interested in. Ac-
cordingly, she throws the materials away.
Sixty days later Mary is charged $59.95 for the first monthly
payment in the health membership club. She contacts the health
membership program to complain and is told that, because she
never contacted the company to terminate the program, she was
automatically enrolled in it on the thirty-first day. Mary immedi-
ately terminates the Visa card and tells the company that she will
not make any further payments on the program. What she did not
know, however, was that the telemarketing firm was also able to bill
Beta Bank, which holds the mortgage on her home. Mary does not
discover the increased charge until she received her annual RESPA
notice from the bank.
While the above facts may seem farfetched, they can all occur
in this age of technology.
B. The Origins Of The Right To Privacy
The belief that privacy is a fundamental right is as old as civili-
zation itself, crossing all time periods and cultures. For instance,
the ancient Greeks in fifth Century B.C. recognized the right to
privacy in the Hippocratic Oath for physicians, which provides,
" [w] hat I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even out-
side of the treatment in regard to the life of men ... I will keep to
myself .... ", In the United States, legal scholars Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis brought attention to the legal underpinnings
of the right to privacy over 100 years ago in their now famous law
review article entitled The Right to Privacy.' In advocating for "the
right to be let alone," they reasoned that both the right to liberty
and the definition of property can encompass privacy interests and
that failure to recognize privacy would mean that "what is whis-
pered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."
4
2. Hippocratic Oath, Fifth Century B.C; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER MEDICAL
DESK DICTIONARY 297 (3d ed. 1993) (defining the Hippocratic Oath as "an oath
that embodies a code of medical ethics and is usually taken by those about to be-
gin medical practice which is, 'Above all else, I will do no harm'").
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
4. Id. at 193-95.
1462 [Vol. 27:3
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1. Privacy As A Liberty Interest
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
United States Constitution provides a basis for certain protections
of an individual's privacy from governmental intrusion, finding pri-
vacy interests rooted in fundamental liberty rights.' This right of
decisional privacy has been extended by the courts to decisions in-
volving marriage,6 procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships,9 and childrearing and education. 0 For example, in Griswold
v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
marital relationship lies within "a zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees."" The Court also held in
Roe v. Wade that the right to privacy, either grounded in the Consti-
tution's concept of personal liberty or in the Ninth Amendment,
includes a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 12 Fur-
ther, a woman who makes a decision to have an abortion has the
right not to have her name publicized and the right to keep the
decision private from others, including her partner. 3  Later in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed the notion that
constitutional liberty and privacy are intertwined, asserting that,
"[a] t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of hu-
man life."' 4
The United States Supreme Court has established that the
constitutional right to privacy also protects an individual's freedom
of association, stating that privacy includes "an individual's choice
to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relation-
5. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (noting that one
aspect of liberty is a right of personal privacy; holding that this right includes
"making certain kinds of important decisions").
6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967).
7. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535 (1942).
8. Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972).
9. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 158 (1944).
10. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925).
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding Connecticut's
law that places restrictions on providing information about contraception uncon-
stitutional as it intrudes upon the right to marital privacy); see also Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453 (evaluating the constitutionality of a law restricting the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons; broadening the Griswold privacy definition so
that it includes single individuals as well as married couples).
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992).
14. Id. at 851.
2001] 1463
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ships."' 5 The sanctity of the home is embraced in constitutional
privacy as well. In Frisby v. Schulz, the Court recognized the worth
of residential privacy by stating, "protecting the well-being, tran-
quility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in
a free and civilized society.", 6 The Fourth Amendment also empha-
sizes privacy rights by asserting that individuals have a right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 7 When interpreting
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
Miranda v. Arizona, the Court stated it gives an individual a "right to
a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the
hallmark of our democracy."' 8
Most states have developed torts for invasion of an individual's
right to privacy which reflect the liberty interest in privacy. The Re-
statement of Torts has long recognized four distinct invasion of
privacy torts consistent with the right to privacy.19 These torts are
intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of one's likeness, publica-
tion of private facts and false light. Intrusion upon seclusion oc-
curs when a person intrudes upon the solitude of another's affairs
when the intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person.2 ' Ap-
propriation happens when a ?erson takes the name or likeness of
another for his own benefit. Publication of private facts takes
place when a person publicizes another's private matter when the
23
publication is highly offensive and not of genuine public interest.
False light applies when a matter is publicized in a way that places
another in a false light when the falsity is highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person and the publisher knows of or acts in reckless dis-
15. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545
(1987).
16. Frisby v. Schulz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 471 (1980)).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects not only areas against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, but also people).
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966) (citation omitted).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1977). William L. Prosser
gave the right to privacy definition by separating the various court rulings that
supported Warren and Brandeis's theories into four distinct causes of action. W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 850-51
(5th ed. 1984).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1977) (adopting Prosser's
privacy tort theory).
21. Id. § 652B.
22. Id. § 652C.
23. Id. § 652D.
[Vol. 27:31464
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regard of the falsity.24
Georgia, the first state to recognize the right to privacy in its
tort law, concluded that the right derived from natural law and was
based on the constitutions of both the United States and Georgia. 5
Other states have determined that the right to privacy evolves from
26common law. Minnesota recently became one of these states in
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.27
In Lake, a woman sued a film processor for unauthorized dis-
28tribution of a photograph depicting her in the nude. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court found that she alleged privacy interests worthy
of protection and subsequently recognized three of the four tradi-
tional privacy torts.9 In doing so, the court echoed the sentiments
of Warren and Brandeis by stating, "[t]he right to privacy is an in-
tegral part of our humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and
active, and a private persona, guarded and preserved. The heart of
our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall become public
and which parts we shall hold close."30
Legislative bodies have likewise enacted numerous statutes that
recognize a liberty right to privacy, designating certain government
data recorded about citizens as confidential and protected from
public inquiry. Information about cancer victims, for instance, may
not be publicized. 3' Tax returns are also deemed confidential.
The identities of individuals who participate in or receive informa-
tion about alcohol or drug abuse programs must be kept confiden-
33 34tial. Welfare application data is protected. Data on students at-
24. Id. § 652E.
25. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905).
26. E.g., McCormack v. Okla. Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980); Truxes v.
Kenco Enters., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113
P.2d 438 (Or. 1941). Other states, finding no constitutional or common law basis
for the invasion of privacy tort, have enacted rights to privacy by statute. E.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-201
(Michie 1995); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992).
27. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
28. Id. at 233.
29. Id. at 235. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the torts of intru-
sion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts and appropriation of one's
likeness. Id. at 236.
30. Id. at 235. For an extended discussion of Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., see
Jane E. Prine, No Longer Living in a Glass House: Every Minnesotan Is Entitled to a
Right to Privacy, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 999 (1999).
31. MINN. STAT. § 144.69 (1998).
32. Id. § 290.611.
33. Id. § 254A.09.
34. Id. § 13.46.
2001] 1465
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tending educational institutions is considered private. A library
patron's book selections may not be disclosed to the public. 36 The
names of individuals who register complaints against real property
owners are regarded as confidential. 37 All information transmitted
in confidence between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual as-
38sault counselor is private. Similarly, most data about farmers who
receive county assistance is private, including information about fi-
39nancial history, current debts and personal and emotional status.
Other laws recognize a liberty interest in the right of privacy by
imposing confidentiality restrictions on personal data. For exam-
ple, physicians generally may not disclose patient data absent con-4,0
sent. Pharmacists are prohibited from disclosing certain data
about their customers.4' Insurers also must not share personal in-
42formation without authorization. Congress statutorily recognized
a personal right to privacy when, in reaction to the disclosure of
Judge Robert Bork's viewing habits by a video storeowner, it en-
acted legislation to prohibit the unauthorized distribution of a cus-43
tomer's video tape rentals. Another federal law recognizing the
importance of privacy requires subscriber cable television records44
to be kept confidential. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act pro-
hibits government employees from "knowingly disclosing or other-
wise making available to any person or entity personal information
about any individual obtained ... in connection with a motor vehi-
cle record" without that person's "express consent."
45
The courts have similarly adopted rules that reflect a liberty in-
terest in the right to privacy. Attorneys are prohibited from disclos-
ing clients' secrets and confidences. Domestic abuse records and
35. Id. § 13.32, amended by, Minn. Laws 2000 ch. 489, art. 1, § 1.
36. Id. § 13.40.
37. Id. § 13.44.
38. Id. § 13.56.
39. Id. § 13.531.
40. Id. § 144.335(3)(a); see also MINN. STAT. § 144.651(16)(1998) (stating
"[p]atients and residents shall be assured confidential treatment of their personal
and medical records, and may approve or refuse their release to any individual
outside the facility.").
41. Id. § 151.213.
42. Id. § 72A.502(1).
43. Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1999).
44. Cable Television Record Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1999).
45. Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, amended by Shelby
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 106-96 (2000); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 168.346, 171.12
(1998).
46. MINN. RuLEs OF PROF'L. CONDUCT 1.6.
1466 [Vol. 27:3
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juvenile records are generally kept confidential. 47 .venile hearings
are closed to most members of the public as well. Further, judges
are permitted to impose protective orders to preserve the private
nature of evidence.
4 9
The courts and legislative bodies have also developed eviden-
tiary rules to safeguard privacy interests as it relates to the testi-
mony of witnesses. For example, in most legal proceedings spouses
50cannot testify for or against their partners without consent.
Members of the clergy may also not be examined as to any com-
munication made "by any person seeking religious or spiritual ad-
vice, aid, or comfort" without the person's consent.' Additionally,
information provided to therapists, whether for mental health or
chemical dependency, is typically considered privileged and may
not be disclosed absent the patient's consent.
52
2. Privacy As A Property Interest
Courts and legislative bodies have also articulated privacy
rights rooted in property law. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
recognized that a bank is generally under a fiduciary duty not to
disclose the content of loan records, particularly as it relates to the
business plan of a company.13 There are also numerous statutes
that recognize that the disclosure of a business's information may
constitute an unfair trade practice. Minnesota's Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, for example, gives businesses remedies for misappro-
priation of information that is not generally known or readily ascer-
tainable and has an independent economic value from its secrecy.54
47. MINN. R. PUB. AccEss TO REcoRDs OFJUDIciAL BRANCH 4, subd. 1 (a); MINN.
R.Juv. PROC. 30.02, subd. 3.
48. MINN. R.Juv. P. 2.01.
49. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.03.
50. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(a)(1998); see also Lundman v. McKown, 530
N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging that a spouse may assert
the marital privilege to bar a witness spouse from testifying).
51. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(c) (1998); see also State v. Orfi, 511 N.W.2d 464,
469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that portions of the defendant's communica-
tion with ministers subject to clergy privilege).
52. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(g)-(i) (1998).
53. Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651 (1976) (find-
ing that a bank is generally under a duty not to disclose the financial condition of
its depositors); see also Cunningham v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 691 (1925); Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d
759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d
284, 290 (Idaho 1961).
54. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-03 (1998).
20011 1467
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Courts have recognized that customer lists of a company may be
considered a trade secret and an asset of the company that may not
be disclosed by an employee.55 Courts have made similar decisions
56with respect to company business plans, records and processes.
Judges may also Vrotect trade secrets by using measures such as in-
camera hearings.
Congress has established the right to privacy as a property in-
terest in certain contexts as well, particularly as it relates to Social
Security numbers 8 and to credit information held by credit bu-
reaus.5 V Congress has also enacted statutes regulating the collec-
tion of information by government employees,6 restricting when
government may access financial information,6' limiting govern-
mental access to telephone records,6' and regulating government
63employees' use of tax records.
3. Privacy Interests Cross National Boundaries
The right to privacy is not only deeply embedded in the
American culture, but internationally as well. The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights asserts that, "[n] o one should be sub-
jected to arbitrary interference with his privacy .... 64 The 1950
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms specifies that, "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life .... ,65 South Africa's Constitution also de-
clares that "[e]veryone has the right to privacy ....,,66 Argentina's
55. E.g., Creative Communication Consultants, Inc. v. Gaylord, 403 N.W.2d
654, 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Tenant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., Inc., 355
N.W.2d 720, 725-26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
56. E.g., Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 888 F.2d 1228,
1231-32 (8th Cir. 1989); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 648 F. Supp.
661, 682 (D. Minn. 1980).
57. MINN. STAT. § 325C.05 (1998).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(c) (2) (C) (viii) (I) (1999) (stating "Social security account
numbers and related records that are obtained or maintained by authorized per-
sons pursuant to any provision of law ... shall be confidential, and no authorized
person shall disclose any such social account number or related record.").
59. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (a) (4), (b) (1999).
60. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1999).
61. Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959 (1999).
62. Access to Telephone Records Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1999).
63. Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a) (1999).
64. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, art. 12 (1948).
65. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, art. 8 (1950).
66. S. AFIR. CONST. § 14(1996).
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Constitution states:
The home is inviolable as is personal corre-
spondence and private papers; the law will deter-
mine what cases and what justifications may be rele-
vant to their search or confiscation. The private
actions of men that in no way offend order nor pub-
lic morals, nor prejudice a third party ... are free
from judicial authority.
67
Many countries have enacted laws that relate to privacy and the
disclosure of personal information. The European Union's recent
directive requires that individuals be informed before organizations
disclose personal data and that the individuals give consent before
disclosure.68 In 1995, Hong Kong created a law "to protect the pri-
vacy of individuals in relation to personal data."6 9 New Zealand en-
acted a privacy law in 1993 that requires agencies that collect per-
sonal information from individuals to make sure that the
individuals are aware that the information is being collected, the
purpose for which the information is being collected, and the in-. . 70
tended recipients of the information. Russia's privacy act states
that, "collection and dissemination of information about private
life, and processing of information which concerns personal and
family secrecy ... is only permissible if a legal provision provides for
this, or the person affected has agreed."71 Sweden's privacy law re-
quires that organizations which maintain personal data to register
with the Data Inspection Board and receive permission from the
board prior to collecting most types of personal information. Ja
pan has a data protection law that governs the use of personal in-
formation in computerized files held by government agencies. 73 It
limits the information that data agencies may collect and imposes
• • • 74
duties of security, access and correction. In 1994, South Korea
67. CONST. ARG. arts. 18, 19.
68. Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EEC on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 1.
69. Ordinance No. 81 of 1995 (H. K.).
70. Privacy Act of 1993 (N.Z.).
71. Law of the Russian Federation on Information, Informatisation and In-
formation Protection,Jan. 25, 1995.
72. Data Protection Act of 1973 (Swed.).
73. Protection of Computer Processed Personal Data Held by Administrative
Organs Act of 1988 (Japan).
74. Id.
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enacted laws regarding the management of computer-based per-
sonal information held by government agencies. The actions of
these countries show that protection of individual privacy has uni-
versal importance.
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Collection And Dissemination Of Personal Information
1. Monitoring And Tracking Individual People
In his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell warns of an
76omnipresent "Big Brother" that knows and sees all. The govern-
ment monitors every individual's conversation and movement.7
The novel's main characters live in constant fear of saying or doing
the wrong thing. It is a world without freedom or personal auton-
omy. Individuals have no control over what information will be-
come public or remain private.
Today, the greatest threat to privacy may not be Orwell's large
government computer, but rather the commercial sector's infinite
network of private databases that collect information about every-
day business transactions and purchases. 78 This thought is captured
by commentatorJane Bryant Quinn, who writes:
When we worry about who might be spying on our
private lives, we usually think about the Feds. But
the private sector outdoes the government every
time. It's Linda Tripp, not the FBI, who's facing
charges under Maryland's laws against secret tele-
phone taping. It's our banks, not the IRS, that
passed our private financial data to telemarketing
firms.
7 9
Indeed, there are currently over 1,000 private companies
compiling comprehensive databases about individual consumers, a
75. The Act on the Protection of Personal Information Managed by Public
Agencies of 1994 (S. Korea).
76. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (Penguin Books 1949).
77. Id.
78. CHARLES SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 4 (St. Martin's Press 1999); see also
John Caher, Privacy Initiative Aims for Consumer Protection, N.Y. L.J.,Jan. 24, 2000, at
1 (quoting New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer saying "[i]t is not big brother
that we now have to be afraid of, but big browser.").
79. Jane Bryant Quinn, The Spies in Your Pocket, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1999, at
1470 [Vol. 27:3
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/8
THE PRIVATIZATION OF BIG BROTHER
ten-fold increase in just five years.80 These companies do not en-
gage in the "mass marketing" of products or the researching of
general demographic groups. Rather, they focus on gathering as
much information as possible about specific people to engage in
what is sometimes called "personalization" or "personal marketing."
The array of available information is only limited by the tech-
nology itself. Each electronically recorded transaction provides a
glimpse into a person's private life."' These pieces of information,
when layered on top of one another, create a complete picture of
each individual . For example, Acxiom Corporation in Conway,
Arkansas maintains a database that operates twenty-four hours a
day, amassing and processing information on ninety-five percent of13
all American households. For a price, Acxiom will sort informa-
tion based on income, lifestyle (outdoor, mechanic, intelligentsia,
etc.), or even a psychological profile of "ethnics who may speak
their native language but do not think in that manner."
8 4
Similarly, the Medical Marketing Service (MMS) offers lists of
people with particular medical conditions. Last fall, MMS offered
for sale nearly 50 lists of individuals suffering from different medi-
cal ailments. MMS sells the names and addresses of 427,000 peo-
ple who are clinically depressed, 1.4 million women who have yeast
infections, and 1 million individuals who have diabetes. 7 MMS also
sells lists of people with Alzheimer's Disease, birth defects, Parkin-/ 1. 88
son's Disease, and "physical handicaps."
80. Robert O'Harrow,Jr., Data Firms Getting Too Personal?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1998, at AO1.
81. WilliamJ. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals' Rights in Personal
Information, 65 FORDHAm L. REV. 951, 952 (1996).
82. Id.
83. AcxIoM CORP., Marketing Materials, in JOEL R. REIDENBERG, NAT'L Ass'N
ATr'Ys GEN., EXAMPLES OF THE SALE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (Privacy Working
Group, Sept. 23-24, 1999) [hereinafter EXAMPLES].
84. Id.
85. MEDICAL MARKETING SERVICE, INC., Marketing Materials, in EXAMPLES, supra
note 83; see also Medical Marketing Service, Inc., available at http://www.mmslists.
corn (last visited July 6, 2000).
86. MEDICAL MARKETING SERVICE, INC., Marketing Materials, in EXAMPLES, supra
note 83.
87. • Id.
88. Id. Other examples of the misuse of medical information include the
partnership between CVS pharmacy and pharmaceutical companies, and the part-
nership between a law firm and a hospital.
In 1998, pharmaceutical companies solicited customers of CVS Pharma-
cies who were identified by the pharmacy as suffering from specific medical condi-
tions. Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-0897-F, 1999 WL 494114, at *1-2
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No information appears to be too personal for companies to
collect and sell, and the boundaries of consent are often ill defined
or non-existent. A New York company offers the names of high
school students according to GPA, religion, ethnicity, and SAT
scores. Another company sells the names of obese African-
American women. A hospital sells the names of its patients who
may be eligible for Social Security insurance to a lawyer. 90 All of
this data is merged into a consumer tracking and information in-
frastructure that becomes larger every day and sold to whomever
may be interested. Every piece of information gathered, stored,
and sorted by these large databases represents an incremental ero-
sion of an individual's right to privacy.
Private information is also readily available for little cost from
electronic research companies: an unlisted phone number costs
$49, a Social Security number costs $49, a bank balance costs $45.91
A company will obtain another person's driving record for $35,
trace a cell phone call for $84, or create a list of stocks, bonds, and
securities for $209.92 A reporter for Forbes Magazine recently learned
first-hand this reality of the information age:
In all of six days Dan Cohn and his web detec-
tive agency ... shattered every notion I had about
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 29, 1999). On behalf of several pharmaceutical companies,
CVS allegedly searched their customer database to find customers who suffered
from high blood pressure or diabetes. Id. Then, CVS allegedly downloaded
names and addresses of those customers onto a separate diskette, and gave the
disk to a direct marketing firm. Id. On behalf of various pharmaceutical compa-
nies, those individuals were mailed advertisements about particular drugs and
were encouraged to speak with their physician. Id. Litigation against CVS Phar-
macies is currently pending. Id.
In 1993, Warren General Hospital in Ohio entered into a partnership
with a local law firm to electronically search its medical records for patients who
might be eligible for Supplemental Security Income reimbursement of medical
expenses. Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 96-T-5582, 1998 WL 156997, at *1-2
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998). The hospital's database included the patient's ad-
dress, birth date, employment information and their admitting diagnosis. Id. The
law firm would contact patients about having their medical treatment paid for by
the Social Security Administration. Id. The law firm would then receive a per-
centage of whatever money they generated for the hospital. Id.
89. STUDENT MARKETING GROUP, INC., Marketing Materials, in ExAMPLEs, supra
note 83; see also Student Marketing Group, Inc., at http://www.studentmarketing.
net (last visited July 6, 2000). Student Marketing Group also sells the names and
addresses of preschool children ages 2-5. Id.
90. VENTuRE DIREcr, Marketing Materials, in EXAMPLES, supra note 83; see also
Venture Direct, at http://www.venturedirect.com (visitedJuly 6, 2000).
91. Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 183.
92. Id.
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privacy in this country (or whatever remains of it).
Using only a keyboard and the phone he was able to
uncover the innermost details of my life: whom I
call late at night; how much money I have in the
bank; my salary and rent. He even got my unlisted
phone numbers, both of them. Okay, so you've
heard it before: America, the country that made
'right to privacy' a credo, has lost its privacy to the
computer. But it's far worse than you think. Ad-
vances in smart data-sifting techniques and the rise
of massive databases have conspired to strip you na-
ked.93
2. The Consumer Tracking And Information Infrastructure
The sale, collection, and integration of personal information
94about consumers are new industries in the information age.
Technology allows businesses to gather information cheaply about
their existing or potential customers and then use that information
95to sell or market other products to those customers. Using com-
plex mathematical formulas and private financial information, data
is sorted and categorized to isolate specific people for marketing
purposes. This process is called "data mining."
The information possessed by these marketing companies goes
far beyond mere demographic data. For example, during a privacy
lawsuit against Metromail Corp., a marketing company, it was
forced to reveal the types of information contained in its database.96
Metromail's computer files contained more than 900 tidbits of in-
formation on individual consumers dating back more than a dec-
ade.9' One individual's file was twenty-five single-spaced pages and
contained information such as her income, marital status, hobbies,
93. Id.
94. Steven Vonder Haar, Data Chase, BRANDWEEK, Sept. 6, 1999, at IQ17 (stat-
ing "[c]all it the Golden Age of Online Data. More than ever before publishers,
marketers and advertising service companies all are racing to compile mounds of
information ....").
95. Wayne W. Eckerson & Lynne Harvey, Customer Intelligence Drives Next-
Generation Web Personalization, at http://www.customers.com (last visited Feb. 25,
2000); see also Kayte VanScoy, Get Inside Your Customers' Heads (and Their Wallets
Too), SMART Bus. FROM ZDWIRE, June 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2000378 (de-
scribing data mining and rules for customer interaction).
96. Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: Personal Files via Computer Offer Money and Pose
Threat, N.Y. TIMES,June 12, 1997, at Al.
97. Id.
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medical ailments, her preferred brand of antacid tablets, whether
she had dentures, and how often she had used room deodorizers,S 98
sleeping aids, and hemorrhoid remedies. Technology like this al-
lows corporations to probe deep into the personal lives of individ-
ual consumers:
[A] jewelry retailer maintains a profile of a person named
John Ring in a customer database, which culls and inte-
grates data from multiple sources both inside and outside
the firm. John's profile shows that he is 42 years old, lives
in Boston, purchases diamond jewelry every six months,
and has a high lifetime value rating. Since John is predis-
posed to buy diamonds, the next time he visits the
[web]site the personalization engine can immediately
show him the firm's current sales on diamond products.
In addition, statistical analysis of all the customer records
shows that John falls in a group that is pre-disposed to
purchase high-end leather products and foreign automo-
biles. The firm decides to run a special promotion in
which it e-mails John a Web-redeemable coupon for a
high-end leather briefcase if he purchases $300 worth of
jewelry by the end of the month. (The e-mail is sent at the
time when John typically buys jewelry.)99
Some will claim that this example demonstrates how technol-
ogy may benefit both the consumer and the business-the con-
sumer receives discounts on products he usually purchases, and the
jeweler acquires a new loyal customer. However, the technology
utilized in this hypothetical may easily be used to target consumers
in more harmful ways. Some individuals most susceptible to tele-
marketing and direct marketing include the unemployed, disabled,
and the elderly, in part because they are the most likely to be home
during the day and read unsolicited mail.' °° Sophisticated report-
ing and analysis tools may be used to target such persons for im-
proper purposes, just as easily as they may identify a person who
likesjewelry and leatherjackets.
98. Id.
99. Eckerson & Harvey, supra note 95, at 2-3.
100. Mark Allan Baginskis, Telemarketing Fraud upon the Elderly Shows No Signs of
Slowing, 11 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 4, 7 (1999); Patrick E. Michela, "You May Have
Already Won ... ": Telemarketing Fraud and the Need for a Federal Legislative Solution, 21
PEPP. L. REv. 553, 574 (1994).
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B. The Public's Expectations Concerning Privacy
1. The Emergence Of Privacy As A Major Issue Of Public Policy
Privacy is not a new concern. Yet, protecting an individual's
right to privacy has recently emerged as one of the most important
public policy issues of the information age. Over one-hundred
years ago, Warren and Brandeis, in their now famous law review ar-
ticle, warned:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken for the protection of
the person, and for securing to the individual ... the right
"to be let alone" .... [N]umerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whis-
pered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops." 10,
As privacy abuses by financial institutions and other large cor-
porations and the lack of legal safeguards have come into national
prominence, novel coalitions have formed among civil liberties ac-
tivists, social conservatives, and libertarians in favor of more privacy
protection. 0 2 On October 13, 1999, for example, the Coalition For
Financial Privacy was formed. 03 Its members included among oth-
ers Phyllis Schlafly of the Eagle Forum and Ralph Nader of theS. 104
Consumers Union. On February 10, 2000, various members of
Congress formed the bi-partisan Congressional Privacy Caucus.
1
0
5
The Caucus supports notice and consent requirements before per-
101. Privacy first emerged as an issue of public policy and concern with the
publication of Warren and Brandeis' article, The Right to Privacy, written over one-
hundred years ago. 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The authors advocated for the
creation of a new tort that protected the private lives of ordinary people from in-
trusion or appropriation. Id. at 195. The computer has made their words even
more applicable and insightful today. The majority of states have now adopted the
common-law right to privacy, but the law does not adequately protect individuals
in the information age. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235
(Minn. 1998) (becoming one of the last states to adopt the common-law right to
privacy).
102. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Postscript on Privacy, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at
EOI.
103. Senator Richard Shelby, Coalition for Financial Privacy, available at
http://www.senate.gov/-shelby/press/prsrs307.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 1999).
104. Id.
105. Clyde Mitchell, Privacy and Gramm-Leach-Bliley's Financial Services Moderni-
zation, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 19, 2000, at 3 (outlining current disputes as a result of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley and formation of Congressional Privacy Caucus).
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sonally-identifiable information may be disclosed. °6 On March 31,
2000, Attorneys General from thirty-three states joined together in
support of stronger financial privacy protections under the Finan-
cial Services Modernization Act, sometimes called the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, which broke down legal walls put in place during
the Depression to keep separate the banking, securities and insur-
ance industries. 1°7 The concerns expressed by these policymakers
are strongly supported by public opinion polls.
2. Overwhelming Expectations By The Public Concerning A Right
To Privacy
Public opinion polls and strong consumer reaction in the face
of privacy violations reflect a strong expectation by consumers con-
cerning their privacy rights.
a. Anecdotal Experience
When personal information about an individual is collected
and sold, it generates intense feelings of betrayal and outrage.108
For instance, after the Minnesota Attorney General's Office an-
nounced its litigation against a bank for revealing its customers'
personal and financial information, the Office was flooded with
thousands of phone calls and letters. Individuals were outraged
that financial institutions engage in such practices. One consumer
wrote, " [t]he offer of 'free services' from a telemarketer who repre-
106. Senator Richard Shelby, Congressional Privacy Caucus, available at http://
www.senate.gov/-shelby/press/prsrs3l5.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2000).
107. Comments from the National Association of Attorneys General on Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (Mar. 31, 2000). Comments were signed by Attorney General Bruce M.
Botelho (Alaska), Janet Napolitano (Arizona), Bill Lockyer (California), Kan Sala-
zar (Colorado), Richard Blumenthal (Connecticut), Robert A. Butterworth (Flor-
ida), Stephen H. Levins (Hawaii Office of Consumer Protection), Alan G. Lance
(Idaho), Jim Ryan (Illinois), Tom Miller (Iowa), CarlaJ. Stovall (Kansas), Andrew
Ketterer (Maine), J. Joseph Curran, Jr. (Maryland), Tom Reilly (Massachusetts),
Jennifer Granholm (Michigan), Mike Hatch (Minnesota), Mike Moore (Missis-
sippi),Jeremiah W. Nixon (Missouri),Joseph P. Mazurek (Montana), Frankie Sue
Del Papa (Nevada), John J. Farmer (New Jersey), Patricia Madrid (New Mexico),
Eliot Spitzer (New York), Heidi Heitkamp (North Dakota), W.A. Drew
Edmondson (Oklahoma), D. Michael Fisher (Pennsylvania), Sheldon Whitehouse
(Rhode Island), Paul Summers. (Tennessee), Jan Graham (Utah), William H.
Sorrell (Vermont), Iver A. Stridiron (Virgin Islands), Christine 0. Gregoire
(Washington), Darrell V. McGraw Jr. (West Virginia).
108. Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1057 (1999) (citing 1996 survey
commissioned by Equifax).
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sents an organization that has my account number does little to
enhance my sense of trust." Another wrote, "[t]his is unacceptable,
this is wrong, it is infuriating." Yet another wrote, "I am still dumb-
founded that a supposedly ethical organization ... would violate my
trust and confidence in them by selling their customer list." A re-
port in an Oregon newspaper aptly summarized most consumers'
reactions to such behavior as "appalling" and "horrifying.
The fair treatment of personal information is an element of
basic human dignity and respect." ° In fact, in one survey, nearly
four out of five people regarded privacy as a fundamental right,
worthy of addition to the list of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. ''..
b. Public Surveys Concerning Consumers'Expectations Of
Privacy
i. 2000 USA Weekend Poll
In the USA Weekend poll, 84% of respondents believed that
too many people have access to their credit report, and 79%
thought that too many people have access to their financial re-
cords." 2 75% of the respondents considered phone calls at home
from telemarketers an invasion of privacy, and 70% expected pri-
vacy invasions to become worse in the next five years.! 13 The major-
ity of respondents also believed that current laws are inadequate to
protect their privacy and are extremely concerned about their abil-
109. Julie Tripp, Information-Selling Crushes Depositors'Faith, PORTLAND OREGO-
NIAN, June 20, 1999, at B05 ("'Appalling' and 'horrifying' were some of the other
adjectives that got a workout last week when readers learned the details of what
the Minnesota Attorney General alleges U.S. Bancorp has been doing with their
account, credit card, and Social Security numbers.").
110. Wal-Mart, 582 N.W.2d at 235 ("The right to privacy is an integral part of
our humanity: one has a public persona, exposed and active, and a private per-
sona, guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of
our lives shall become public and which parts we shall hold close."); see also Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing the right to privacy as
a fundamental right).
111. Sovern, supra note 108, at 1057.
112. Jedediah Purdy, An Intimate Invasion, USA WEEKEND, June 30-July 2, 2000,
at 7 (stating that 62% of the respondents believed that too many people have ac-
cess to their driving record, and 61% say that too many people have access to their
medical records).
113. Id. (noting that sixty-five percent of respondents believed that Internet
companies who track computer use and transactions have invaded their privacy,
and 60% of respondents considerjunk mail an invasion of their privacy).
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ity to control who has access to their personal information."1
4
ii. 1999 Wall-Street Journal-NBC Survey
In the Fall of 1999, a Wall-StreetJournal-NBC survey asked peo-
ple what they feared most in the coming century.1 5 The answer,.1 * r. • ,1 16 !
most often given was "the loss of privacy. Indeed, people were
more fearful of the invasion of their privacy than of terrorism,
global warming or overpopulation.1
7
iii. 1999 IBM Consumer Privacy Survey
In December 1999, IBM conducted an international survey
about privacy and privacy issues. It found that more people in the
United States believe that personal information is vulnerable to
misuse than respondents in the United Kingdom or Germany.""
Specifically, 94% of consumers surveyed in the United States think
that personal information is vulnerable to misuse compared to 78%
and 72% in the United Kingdom and Germany, respectively.1 9
iv. 1998 AARP Survey
A survey conducted by the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP) in December 1998, and released in February 1999,
shows the concern many elderly people have about the loss of their
privacy: 78% of the respondents believed that federal and state laws
are not strong enough to protect personal privacy from businesses
that collect information about consumers, 87% of respondents
are bothered by businesses, government agencies, and web sites
that sell their personal information to other businesses,21 81% op-
114. Id.
115. N.Y. SENATE, THE SENATE MAJORITY TASK FORCE ON THE INVASION OF PRI-
VACY 12 (2000) [hereinafter SENATE]; see also Albert R. Hunt, Bright Past Kindles
America's Hope, WALL ST.J., Sept. 16, 1999, at A9 (describing poll results).
116. SENATE, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Grant Lukenbill, Consumers Most Worried About Privacy, DM
NEWS, Dec. 29, 1999).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Mary Alice O'Brien, State Legislative Chair, American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons, Testimony before the New York State Senate Majority Task Force
on the Invasion of Privacy (Apr. 15, 1999)); see also AM. ASs'N RETIRED PERSONS, 39
DATA DIGEST, February 1999 (reporting December 1998 survey results with a +/- 4
% margin of error).
121. Id.
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posed the internal sharing of customers' personal and financial in-
formation by corporate affiliates, and 42% of respondents did not
know whom they would turn to for assistance if a company inap-
propriately shared or sold their personal information.
12
v. Harris Surveys
In 1997, a Harris survey found that the majority of consumers
engaging in online activities are worried about the confidentiality
and security of the Internet. 12 Respondents stated that they do not
trust Internet companies, nor do they trust the voluntary privacy
policies of these companies. 24 Some 56% of online users believe
that the government should enact laws governing the use of con-125
sumer information collected via the Internet. In December 1998,
another Harris survey found that 88% of consumers are worried
about threats to their personal privacy.2 6 78% believed businesses
ask for too much information about them.
127
vi. Boston Consulting Group Survey On Electronic
Commerce
According to a survey conducted by the Boston Consulting
Group, 86% of consumers want to be able to control personal data,
and 81% believe web sites do not have the right to resell personal
information about them to third parties. 12 Indeed, 70% of survey
respondents said that concerns about privacy were the primary rea-
son they do not register at web sites and, when they do, 27% of the
122. Id.
123. Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation Is Inadequate,'49 S.C. L. REv. 847, 849 (1998) (citing
Dr. Alan F. Westin, Testimony before the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Sub-
committee of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, Electronic Payment Sys-
tems, Electronic Commerce, and Consumer Privacy, FED. NEws SERV. (Sept. 18, 1997)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Carol Krol, A Hot Marketing Concept is Running Smack into Big Concerns
About the Extent of Company Usage of Personal Information: Consiumers Reach the Boiling
Point Over Privacy Issues, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 1999.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 850 (citing Drew Clark, Worries About Privacy Rain on Net Commerce
Parade, Am. BANKER, July 3, 1997, at 14). A 1999 AT&T study found that Internet
users are more likely to provide information when they are not identified.
Melinda Reid Hatton & Mark Paulding, Online Privacy - Some Milestones for the Mil-
lennium, 587 PLI/PAT 823, 825-26 (2000). The AT&T study also found that 79%
felt that it was important to their decision to use the Internet if the company
shares information with other companies or organizations. Id.
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time the information they provide to register is false. 129
vii. 1996 DIRECT Poll
In 1996, DIRECT, a prominent marketing magazine, con-
ducted a national survey.30 83% of the public surveyed supported a
law requiring companies to obtain consent before including con-
sumers on mailing lists."' 78% of respondents supported an opt-in
system, even if it meant that they would not receive new mailings,
13 2
and 58% of the poll's respondents wanted to outlaw the collection
and dissemination of Social Security numbers.
13
viii. 1997 MONEY Magazine Poll And 1991 TIME-CNN
Poll
In 1997, a Money Magazine Poll found that 88% of the public
favors a privacy bill of rights.'3 This bill of rights would require
companies to tell consumers and employees exactly what kind of• . . 135
personal information they collect and how they use it. Similarly,
a 1991 TIME-CNN poll found that ninety-three percent of respon-
dents believed that the law should require companies to obtain
permission from consumers before selling their personal informa-
tion. 1
6
ix. 2000 Star Tribune Poll
A survey by Minnesota's largest newspaper revealed that 87%
of those surveyed want a ban on the commercial sharing of their
phone-calling and Web-browsing habits unless the company obtains
a consumer's permission. 117 The survey of Minnesota citizens, con-
ducted by the Star Tribune newspaper, also found that the support
129. Budnitz, supra note 123, at 851.
130. SENATE, supra note 115, at 12.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Sovern, supra note 108, at 1062.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Conrad deFiebre, Minnesotans Make Public Their Desire for More Privacy Pro-
posals to Restrict Telemarketers, Others Find Broad Support, STAR TRIB., Apr. 6, 2000, at
B1; see also jim Ramstad's 2000 Questionnaire Results, RAMSTAD REP., Summer 2000, at
3 (finding that eighty-four percent of Congressional District Three respondents
favored "new regulations to prevent businesses from sharing your personal infor-
mation with other businesses").
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for such privacy measures runs "deep and wide" across party
lines. 138
c. Consumers Strongly React To Breach Of Privacy By Vendors
When consumers are made aware of how their personal in-
formation is being sold or collected without consent, they over-
whelmingly condemn the action in what may be called a "privacy
revolt." These privacy revolts, some of which are listed below, illus-
trate the passion people feel about their privacy.
i. Sale Of Telephone Listings
In 1990, New York Telephone disclosed in its billing state-
ments that it intended to sell its customer white pages listings to
third parties. 1 9 A total of 800,000 customers told the company to
remove their names from the list.140 Bell Atlantic's announcement
to sell its white pages directory in 1995 created a similar outcry
from consumers for more privacy.141
ii. Sale Of Name, Address, Estimated Income, And
Propensity To Buy
In 1991, Lotus Development and Equifax announced a plan to
market a CD-ROM product known as "Lotus Marketplace: House-
holds." 14' The CD-ROM was to contain information on eighty mil-
lion households, including names, addresses, estimated income,
and propensity to buy over one hundred types of consumer prod-
Ucts. Anyone could purchase this information for $695.00.4 Af-
ter the product was announced, 30,000 consumers demanded re-
moval of their names, and the project was abandoned.
45
138. deFiebre, supra note 137, at B1.
139. Budnitz, supra note 123, at 849.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Joshua D. Blackman, A Proposalfor Federal Legislation Protecting Informational
Privacy Across the Private Sector, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 431,
435 (1993).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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iii. Sale Of Computer Chip That Monitors On-Line
Activity
In 1999, Intel Corporation abandoned its plan to introduce a
new Pentium III chip that contained an imbedded serial number to
allow the company to trace the equipment and consumer use.146
Despite possible benefits, consumers threatened to boycott Intel
when the chip was announced. 147
iv. Coupling Internet Browsing Habits With User Names
And Addresses
In March 2000, DoubleClick abandoned its plan to merge con-
sumers' heretofore anonymous Internet browsing habits with their
names, addresses, and phone numbers gleaned from more tradi-
tional database sources. 48 DoubleClick is the largest and most in-
fluential e-commerce advertising network and has a partnership
with virtually every advertiser on the Internet.149 DoubleClick col-
lects millions of pieces of information about consumers every day,
such as where they shop and spend time on the Internet, but much
of this information is anonymous."O The company planned to start
matching this anonymous information with outside sources, thus
eliminating an individual's on-line privacy.15' DoubleClick aban-
doned these plans in the face of public and governmental pressure,
including the threat of litigation.
v. Sale Of Drivers'License Photographs
Likewise, in February 1999, South Carolina, Florida, and Colo-
rado canceled their attempt to sell drivers' license photographs to
retailers and police. 5 3 When citizens learned of the effort, they
flooded state offices with calls and e-mails. 154 Facing such strong
citizen opposition, the states terminated their contracts.
155
146. Hatton & Paulding, supra note 128, at 840.
147. Id.
148. Privacy Din Sparks DoubleClick Deal, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 6, 2000, at 1,
available at 2000 WL 8173467.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. CHARLES SYKES, THE END OFPRiVACY4 (St. Martin's Press 1999).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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3. Strong Public Expectation Of Privacy Stifled At Legislative Level
By Intense Lobbying Efforts Of Industry
Despite staunch public support, recent legislative efforts to
safeguard individual privacy have been largely unsuccessful. In the
1999-2000 legislative session, forty-one states introduced more than
one hundred bills designed to enhance individual privacy protec-
tion.156 Virtually every proposal to strengthen privacy protection
was defeated. Most people attribute the defeat to a powerful lobby-
ing effort on behalf of financial institutions, insurance companies,
telemarketers, and retailers. 57
According to news reports, a proposal for enhanced financial
privacy in the State of Washington was defeated by "an army of lob-
byists" from "out-of-state megacorporations." 5 8 Washington Attor-
ney General Christine Gregoire counted sixty-nine business lobby-
ists actively working to defeat her privacy proposals. 59  In
Minnesota, privacy proposals were formally opposed by 118 lobby-
ists. 16  At one hearing, fifty-nine lobbyists signed up to testify
against a bill to establish a state "Do-Not-Call" list and to require
telemarketers to get express consent before they bill a credit
card.161
Federal privacy proposals also face intense opposition by both
companies and traditional trade associations. 162 There have been
several proposals to close many of the loopholes in the federal
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, which
allows affiliated banks, insurance companies, stock brokerages, and
telemarketers to share consumer information with one another
without consent.16  However, these proposals have not as of this
writing emerged from committee due to intense pressure from
lobbyists opposed to stronger privacy laws.' 64 The industry wants
156. Rachel Zimmerman & Glenn R. Simpson, Lobbyists Swarm to Stop Tough
Privacy Bills in States, WALL ST.J., Apr. 21, 2000, at Al6.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Washington Attorney General Christine Gregoire).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also Conrad deFiebre, House Commerce Panel Puts Telemarketing
Measure on Hold, STAR TRIB., Apr. 19, 2000, at B5.
162. Zimmerman & Simpson, supra note 156, at A16 (quoting Washington At-
torney General Christine Gregoire).
163. Glenn R. Simpson, Financial-Privacy Legislation Expected Today, WALL. ST. J.,
May 4, 2000, at A2 (outlining President Clinton's proposal to label financial-
privacy violations as unfair trade practices).
164. Id.
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desperately to retain the privacy provisions originally enacted,
which one commentator, William Safire, referred to as a "sellout"
engineered by the banking lobby. 
65
Indeed, privacy opponents have created well-financed organi-
zations designed to stop any legislation. 16 6 The National Business
Coalition on E-Commerce and Privacy has over a dozen members,
including General Electric Co., Fidelity Investments, Visa USA Inc.,
State Street Corp., and Deere & Co.'67 Each member of the roup
must pay at least $40,000 a year to fund the lobbying effort. IF The
Financial Services Coordinating Council represents the American
Bankers Association, American Council of Life Insurance, Ameri-
can Insurance Association, Investment Company Institute, and the
Securities Industry Association. 69  The Privacy-Plus Coalition is
comprised of telemarketers and insurance companies and has been
active in virtually every state.17 Senator Margarita Prentice, a spon-
sor of the Washington State financial privacy bill, described the
Coalition's strategy as utilizing "innuendo, lies, timing, [and] bad
faith." 171 The lobbyists' goal is simply to hold the line, under the
165. William Satire, Stop Cookie-Pushers, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2000.
166. E.g., Michael Schroeder, Groups Seek to Pre-Empt Wave of Rules to Protect Con-
sumer-Finance Data, WALL ST.J., Feb. 10, 2000, at A2 (stating that companies such as
General Electric Company, Fidelity Investments, and Visa USA Inc. have agreed to
each contribute $40,000 per year to a coalition to push Congress to preempt states
from adopting strict privacy laws).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. John Dugan, The New Federal Financial Privacy Law: A Comprehensive Ap-
proach That Should Be Given More Time To Work (2000) (listing member organiza-
tions "representing America's Diversified Financial Services Community" on book-
let header), as published by Financial Servs. Coordinating Council.
170. Gregoire Waters Down Her Consumer Privacy Proposal, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 2, 2000.
171. Id. Opponents of privacy legislation have advanced three principal argu-
ments against the various privacy proposals. Id. First, industry representatives ar-
gue that most people are not concerned about privacy; it is just a political or me-
dia created issue. Id. This argument is made despite contrary public opinion polls
and bi-partisan support of enhanced privacy protection. Id.
Second, opponents argue that the various privacy proposals will chill the
economy. Yet, at a hearing on a financial privacy bill in Minnesota (S.F. 3000),
legislators pressed lobbyists to provide a specific example of how the privacy pro-
posal would interfere with conducting business, but no person in the room could
provide a specific example. Testimony of Subcommittee on Data Privacy of Minnesota
Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 24, 2000).
Third, lobbyists claim that privacy is complex and thus deserves to be
studied before any action is taken. To that end, Rep. Asa Hutchinson (R-Ark) re-
cently proposed a $2.5 million dollar commission to study privacy. However, a
study is unnecessary because it represents yet another excuse to delay substantive
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theory that if privacy legislation is adopted anywhere, "it's a hole in
the dike and others will begin adopting it."'
72
IV. PROPERTY DAMAGE DUE To PRIVACY VIOLATIONS
Not all information sharing is alike. There is a significant dis-
tinction between information sharing for the purposes of respond-
ing to a customer's request versus sharing information without the
consumer's knowledge or consent to market goods or services un-
related to that request. The difference is rooted in the expecta-
tions of the consumer and whether he or she has given consent to
the particular use of the data. The privacy debate should properly
focus on the use of information beyond the legitimate purposes for
which it was initially collected or disclosed-the so-called secondary
use of information. This section, therefore, focuses only on the
harm caused when commercial entities share information with
third party telemarketers or for marketing an affiliate's unrelated
goods and services.
Over the past ten years, commercial interests have collected
massive amounts of information about individuals which is used
readily to encroach on consumer privacy. The wide dissemination
of such information and purchasing habits has harmed consumers
by creating an environment susceptible to identity theft and unau-
thorized charges.'73 There is also a growing perception that the fi-
enforcement and legislative action and it duplicates what everyone knows-that
companies collect a lot of information and disclose it without the consumer's
knowledge or meaningful consent, and that people want real privacy protections
now. Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch, Testimony submitted to the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology (May 15, 2000)
[hereinafter Hatch].
172. Zimmerman & Simpson, supra note 156, at A16.
173. While critics of privacy legislation often point to the "democratization of
credit" as a benefit to low-income and middle-income consumers, the availability
of credit has also come at a cost. Fred H. Cate, FINANCIAL SERVS. COORDINATING
COUNCIL, Personal Information in Financial Servs.: The Value of a Balanced Flow 17
(2000) (writing in opposition to California privacy initiatives). The wide dissemi-
nation of consumer information touches upon the increasing prevalence of preda-
tory lending practices. Id. The subprime mortgage market has grown from $10
billion in 1993 to over $150 billion in 1998. Michael Schroeder, Summers Calls for
Legislation to Curb Predatory Lending in Mortgage Markets, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2000,
at A2. Consumer organizations and HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo are con-
cerned that the growth in the subprime market is partially due to financial institu-
tions pushing minorities into subprime loans when they actually qualify for the
lower interest rates and fees typical of a prime loan. Id. Subprime loans accounted
for the majority of home-loan refinancings in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods in 1998, but only nine percent in white neighborhoods. Id. Afri-
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nancial market is less secure and that partnerships between finan-
cial institutions and telemarketers may destabilize the financial in-
dustry.
An example of the widespread use of this information is the
explosion of pre-approved credit card offers filling mailboxes
across the country on a daily basis. Credit card interest rates, how-
ever, have remained stable at about eighteen percent for over
twenty years despite the decrease in the costs to service and fund
these credit cards.14 The interest rates also seem to bear little rela-
tion to an individual's actual credit-worthiness or fluctuations in
the economy.'7 5 Meanwhile the amount of credit card debt in the
United States has increased from $39 billion in 1983 to approxi-
mately $156 billion in 1993.176 There is no evidence that credit card
debt has decreased from 1993 to present.
A. Increase In Identity Theft
Between 500,000 and 700,000 people will have their identities
stolen this year, and the problem costs consumers nearly $1 billion'77
per year. Identity thieves often operate by opening a credit card
account using their victim's name, date of birth, or Social Security
number. 78  They then use that credit card to rack-up charges for
which they never pay the bill. 79 Identity thieves also open checking
can-Americans in high-income neighborhoods are also twice as likely to receive a
subprime loan than families in low-income white neighborhoods. Id.; see also Dee
DePass, Feds Likely to Target Wells Fargo's Web Site, STARTRIB.,June 24, 2000 (alleging
that bank uses information about customers' existing ZIP codes to direct them to
certain other ZIP codes based on their current neighborhood's racial profile).
174. U.S. Credit Card Industry: Competitive Developments Need To Be Closely Moni-
tored, U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHAPTERR EP., Apr. 28, 1994, at 1-2.
175. Id. at 2 (noting the wide difference between the cost of funds and average
credit card interest rates).
176. Id
177. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Identity Fraud: Information on PrevaLENCE,
COST, AND INTERNET IMPACT IS LIMITED 4 (May 1998) [hereinafter IDENTITY FRAUD] .
The actual estimate of the costs of identity fraud is difficult to determine. Id. The
IRS recently detected $137 million in fraudulent refund schemes. Id. The Secret
Service estimates that actual losses to victimized individuals and institutions are
$745 million. Id. Officials at VISA U.S.A., Inc. and MasterCard International es-
timate that it cost its member banks $407 million in 1997. Id. The American
Bankers Association reported that large banks had dollar losses averaging about
$20 million per bank in 1996. Id.
178. FED. TRADE COMM'N, IDENTITY THEFT: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN To YOUR
GOOD NAME 2 (February 2000).
179. Id.
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accounts and write bad checks, or establish cellular phone service,
in the victim's name with no intention of paying the service fees.' s°
In all of these cases, the delinquent charges are recorded on the
victim's credit report. Individual victims of identity theft spend an
average of two or more years attempting to fix their credit report
and restore their credit rating. A recent study found an average
of $18,000 in unauthorized charges per identity theft victim.
18 2
Identity theft is directly related to the erosion of privacy. As
personally-identifying information has become freely available, the
rate of identity theft has increased. According to Trans Union
Corporation, one of the national credit bureaus, two-thirds of all
consumer inquiries to the company's Fraud Victim Assistance De-
partment involve identity fraud. 18  The total number of inquiries
has also increased from 35,235 in 1992 to 522,922 in 1997,1S4 and
yet, the free-flow of personal information continues virtually un-
checked. 185
There are currently no laws that provide consumers the right
to block access to their credit reports without consent.186 There are
also no laws to prevent someone from buying or selling an individ-
ual's Social Security number without their consent, or to prevent a
company from refusing to do business with individuals who do not
divulge their Social Security number.1
87
Neither consumer education nor criminalizing identity theft
has been sufficient to stop the misuse of personal information and
subsequent fraud. While an individual's financial privacy has
eroded, credit bureaus have generated "tens of millions" of dollars
annually from the sale of personally-identifying information.
180. Id.
181. Margaret Mannix, Getting Serious About Identity Theft, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Nov. 8, 1999; Michelle Singletary, Laws Are Failing to Keep Pace with Rate of
Identity Theft, SUN-SENTINEL, May 15, 2000, at 19 (citing California Public Interest
Research Group (CALPIRG) and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse study regarding
the victims of identity theft).
182. Singletary, supra note 181, at 19.
183. IDENTITY FRAUD, supra note 177, at 3-4.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 55.
186. William Safire, 'Identity Theft'Demands Legislation, HOUSTON CHRON., May
12, 2000, at A42.
187. Id.; see also Singletary, supra note 181, at 19.
188. IDENTITY FRAUD, supra note 177, at 5 (quoting representative from the As-
sociated Credit Bureaus regarding revenue generated from sale of information).
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B. Prevalence Of Unauthorized Charges Via Pre-Acquired Account
Telemarketing
Telemarketing fraud is a $15 to $40 billion dollar enterprise. 's 9
Many consumer organizations, federal agencies, and state agencies
have joined together to fight telemarketing fraud by educating
consumers and prosecuting unscrupulous telemarketers.'9 0 Unfor-
tunately, the free-flow of information has created a new marketing
method called pre-acquired account telemarketing.
Pre-acquired account telemarketing typically occurs when a fi-
nancial institution sells their customer's account history to a tele-
marketer without the customer's express consent.'9 ' The telemar-
keter then uses this information to call an individual consumer
without disclosing that it already possesses the individual's account
information or that it has the ability to charge the individual's ac-
count. The telemarketer's possession of this information can lead
to a significant number of unauthorized charges, in part because
consumers believe that a customer must read his or her account
number over the phone or submit a signed form in order to con-
sent to the charge. ' 92 Pre-acquired account telemarketing decep-
tively takes advantage of this belief because the telemarketer never
asks for an account number or other financial data. Rather, the
telemarketer engages in a low threshold sales technique where the
customer's assent to try a thirty-day free offer is, unknown to the
consumer, used to charge his or her account thirty days later. In-
terviews of hundreds of complainants by the attorney general's of-
189. Michela, supra note 100, at 573-74.
190. The AARP, Council of Better Business Bureaus' Foundation, Department
of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Trade Commission, National
Association of Attorneys General, Security and Exchange Commission, and the
U.S. Postal Inspection Service began a joint effort called the "kNOw Fraud" pro-
gram. KNOw FRAUD, TELEMARKETING FRAUD: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW (1999)
(pamphlet providing tips on consumer information). The kNOw Fraud program
is designed to educate consumers about telemarketing and marketing fraud
through videos and brochures. Id.
191. Telemarketers may also purchase the ability to debit an individual's
checking account or credit card account. Although the telemarketing firms may
theoretically not possess the account numbers, in reality they have complete con-
trol over a consumer's account.
192. The reading of a credit card number or providing written authorization
symbolizes the "meeting of the minds" required by contract law. In the past, con-
sumers would know that they are actually purchasing a product and will be billed
for that product if they provide affirmative authorization. Pre-acquired account
telemarketing eliminates that safeguard, and creates an environment where the
consumer is at the mercy of the telemarketer.
1488 [Vol. 27:3
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/8
THE PRIVATIZATION OF BIG BROTHER
fice show that the consumers had no knowledge that their assent to
a thirty day "free trial" meant that the telemarketer could charge
their account.
While telemarketing companies investigated by the attorney
general's office claim that they obtain express oral consent before
billing an individual's account, a Federal Trade Commission task
force found that the companies' definitions of "consent" frequently
fall far short of protecting consumer interests. 193 Consumers often
are not meaningfully told that the telemarketing company will
automatically bill their credit cards after thirty days, and thus the
consumers' belief that the telemarketer cannot charge them since
they never actually disclosed their account number remains in-
tact.194 Rather than obtain a card number from the consumer, the
telemarketer obtains agreement from the consumer only to receive
a "packet of information," which the telemarketer takes as express
consent to debit the consumer's account."5
The State of Minnesota's lawsuit against MemberWorks, Inc.,
which uses customer information obtained from financial institu-
tions to market a variety of discount membership programs, is illus-
trative of how pre-acquired account telemarketing works. Mem-
berWorks used data obtained from financial institutions to
telemarket an offer of a thirty-day free trial enrollment in its mem-
bership programs, telling some consumers that "you don't have to
make a decision over the phone."1 9 However, consumers actually
were making an important decision over the phone to allow Mem-
berWorks to charge their credit card or checking account for en-
rollment in the membership club if the consumer did not call
MemberWorks within thirty days to cancel.' 97 Numerous consum-
ers believed they were protected because they had not revealed
198their account number to MemberWorks. Unfortunately, they didnot know that MemberWorks could charge their account because
193. FTC ADVISORY COMM. ON ONLINE AcCESS AND SEcuRITy, FINAL REPORT 17
(May 15, 2000) (describing authentication of credit card purchases). The advisory
committee notes that merely using an individual's maiden name, birth date, and
Social Security number is a risky form of verification because they are so widely
available. Id.
194. Hatch, supra note 171.
195. Id.
196. Hatch v. MemberWorks, Inc., No. MC99-010056 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 18,
2000).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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of their marketing agreement with the customer's bank.9 Mem-
berWorks made much fanfare about its claim that it had audiotapes
documenting consumers' consent to such charges; however, many
audiotapes produced by MemberWorks during litigation did not
document a meaningful consent from consumers prior to charging
their accounts.200
State and federal prosecutors of those who perpetrate tele-
marketing fraud typically tell consumers to protect themselves by
never giving a credit card number, checking account number, So-
cial Security number, or other sensitive information to an unknown
caller. Unfortunately, this advice will no longer stop fraud because
telemarketing firms have already purchased that information from
financial institutions before the phone call is ever made.
C. Potential To Destabilize Financial Institutions
The Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s caused
tremendous financial instability in the United States. Nine-
212thousand banks collapsed between 1929 and 1933. - At the urging
of President Roosevelt, Congress enacted laws to bring order to the
system, including creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) to guarantee stability and be a "symbol of confi-
dence. 20  With the deregulation of the financial industry by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, many of the statutory safeguards
put in place as a result of the Depression have been repealed.
Widespread information sharing may threaten confidence indi-
viduals have in their financial institutions.2 4
In the mid-1990s, state and federal agencies were alerted to an
information-sharing agreement between NationsBank and its in-
house stock brokerage subsidiary. NationsBank had revealed the
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Symbol of Confidence, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (last modified July 27,
1999).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Ed Mierzwinski, New Bank Laws May Increase Threats to Consumers' Privacy,
U.S. PIRG, Fall 1999, at 4 (stating "[e]arlier this year, Congress had a golden op-
portunity to address the financial side of this [privacy] problem, as it enacted a
sweeping rewrite of financial law that will allow banks, insurance companies and
stock brokerages to merge with each other. Yet the law passed by Congress not
only failed to better protect consumer privacy, it may have made things worse.");
see also Hatch, supra note 171.
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names of its customers whose low-risk CDs were coming due.' °
The stock brokerage then enlisted a telemarketing firm to target
those customers. The telemarketers allegedly convinced more than
18,000 bank customers to shift their low-risk investments into high-
206
risk uninsured hedge funds. Yet, NationsBank claimed it did not
violate any existing privacy laws. It would appear that such actions
might even be permissible under the lackluster privacy provisions
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
201
According to John Hawke Jr., Comptroller of the Currency,
banks have "assiduously shied away from taking a leadership role in
developihg industry standards for consumer protection. 2 0" Specifi-
cally, Hawke condemned the information sharing practices be-
tween some financial institutions and telemarketers as "seamy, if
not downright unfair and deceptive.2 0 9
1. Information Sharing Is A Widespread Practice In The Financial
Industry
With little notice to their customers, many financial institu-
tions and telemarketers have routinely entered into marketing
agreements with one another over the past few years. These mar-
keting agreements allow the telemarketer to have access to bank
customer information, such as names, phone numbers, Social Se-
curity numbers, account balances, and credit limits. The amount
of information distributed varies, but the marketing agreements
have become a standard industry practice among the country's
210
largest financial institutions.
On June 9, 1999, a lawsuit against US Bancorp by the Minne-
205. In the Matter of NationsSecurities and NationsBank, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-39947, 67 S.E.C. Docket 143, at 4 (May 4, 1998).
206. Id.
207. Mierzwinski, supra note 204, at 4. After the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was alerted to the practice, it brought a claim against Nations-
Bank. Id. The SEC and NationsBank settled in 1998 for $7 million, because of a
violation of investment laws. Id. The private class action lawsuit eventually settled
for $40 million. Leslie Wayne, Privacy Matters: When Bigger Banks Aren't Better, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998 (describing NationsBank case and settlement).
208. Paul Beckett, Comptroller Warns Banks on Practice of Giving Telemarketers Cus-
tomer Data, WALL ST.J.,June 8, 1999, at A4.
209. Id.
210. Henry Gilgoff, Private Matters: More Banks Now Selling Personal Consumer
Data, NEWSDAY, July 25, 1999 (stating that "[t] he deals are widespread among the
country's biggest banks, Hawke said in a recent interview.") A statement by a US-
Bancorp spokesman said that the cooperative marketing programs are "common
practices." Id.
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sota Attorney General's Office revealed the prevalence of financial
information sharing between telemarketers and financial institu-
tions.2 1' The lawsuit alleged that the bank disclosed the names,
phone numbers, social security numbers, account balances, and
credit limits of almost one million of its customers after telling
them that "all personal information you supply to us will be consid-• ,212
ered confidential.' At the end ofJune 1999, US Bancorp settled
the lawsuit for $3 million and stopped participation in marketing
programs for nonfinancial products.
In the weeks following the US Bancorp lawsuit, numerous
other financial institutions revealed that they had been engaging in
214similar practices that affected millions of consumers. While it ini-
tially did not reveal the details of its marketing practices, Wells
Fargo eventually revealed that it had shared customer information
with telemarketers and claimed it would temporarily suspend the
215practice. Bank of America, Union Bank, and Citigroup also ad-
mitted to sharing customer financial data. 16 CHASE Manhattan
revealed that it similarly had entered joint marketing agreements,
and eventually entered a settlement agreement with the New York
Attorney General's office.1 7 In total, these financial institutions
have at least seventy percent of the market share in the nation's
218forty largest metropolitan areas.
2. Loss Of Confidence And Destabilizing Effect Of Information
Sharing
Although financial institutions may profit from cross-
211. Hatch, supra note 171.
212. Hatch v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, Civ. Action No. 99-872 (D. Minn. filed June
9, 1999).
213. Id.; see also Dee DePass, US Bank Kills Marketing Deals: But Still Plans to Fight
State Lawsuit, STAR TRIB.,June 11, 1999, at D 1.
214. Marcy Gordon, Chase Privacy Pact May Prompt Trend, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
2000 (stating that as many as 22 million consumers nationwide have been affected
by Chase Manhattan's decision to disclose personal customer information).
215. DePass, supra note 213, at Dl, D4 (stating,"Now Wells Fargo, which for
three days after Hatch's suit didn't reveal details of its telemarketing relationships,
said it is [suspending its relationship with telemarketers].").
216. Gilgoff, supra note 210, at F07 (describing Citibank's decision to imple-
ment a moratorium on information exchanges with telemarketers).
217. Gordon, supra note 214.
218. Tania Padgett, Report Says Good Merger Targets in Short Supply, AM. BANKER,
June 1, 2000 (stating that "On average, the five largest players hold 73.2% market
share in the forty attractive growth markets. In thirteen of the areas, deposit mar-
ket share held by the top five is 80% or more.").
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marketing opportunities, these developments come at a price.""
Customer complaints to the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
(OCC), the agency that regulates nationally-chartered banks, have
more than quadrupled from 1997 to 1999. If financial institu-
tions continue to share information, an increase in such complaints
are likely.
In November of 1997 a convict on probation for aiding and
abetting a counterfeiting scheme was able to purchase from Char-
ter Pacific Bank of Los Angeles at least three credit card databases.
Charter Pacific Bank sold several million credit card numbers to
the convicted felon, who then fraudulently billed 900,000 of the ac-
counts for a total of $45.7 million before he was stopped. 221 These
Visa and MasterCard holders were billed for unauthorized charges
222to a network of X-rated websites run by the felon. Charter Bank
responded to the fiasco by stating that it had not violated any exist-
223ing privacy laws.
The sale and abuse of confidential consumer information is
contrary to the expectations and trust individuals have historically
placed in their financial institutions and may cause fundamental
224damage to the banking system. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, John Hawke, has observed:
I cannot overstate the importance of addressing consumer
expectations about the confidential treatment of financial
information to maintaining the public's confidence in the
banking system. And I urge that, in crafting an appropri-
ate response to consumer privacy concerns, banks and
Congress put themselves in the shoes of a customer and
ask, "Will my financial institution use my personal infor-
mation in a manner consistent with my expectations?" and
"Will I have any control over the use of my informa-
219. Gilgoff, supra note 210, at F07 (quoting Comptroller Hawke, "[a]lthough
financial conglomerates may profit from the cross-marketing opportunities and
consumers may benefit from the availability of a broader array of custom-tailored
products and services ... there is a serious risk that these developments may come
at a price to individual privacy.").
220. Beckett, supra note 208, at A4. In 1997, the OCC logged 16,000 consumer
complaints. Id. In 1998, the number of complaints rose to more than 68,000 and
in 1999 it reached over 100,000. Id.
221. Jeff Leeds, Bank Sold Credit Card Data to Felon, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1999.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Gilgoff, supra note 210, at F07.
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tion? 
,21
5
Under the existing law, the answer to both of Hawke's ques-
tions is uncertain.
V. PROTECTING CONSUMERS WITH AN OPT-IN
The best response to many of the privacy concerns that have
recendy arisen is the adoption of an opt-in system for highly sensi-
tive personal information. Unfortunately, the debate over whether
commercial entities should implement an opt-in or an opt-out sys-
tem, or no system at all, has been muddled with misinformation
and wild claims about the effect either system will have on informa-
tion collection and an individual's right to privacy.216 The following
section attempts to describe an opt-in system, describe the inherent
problems with its alternative, an opt-out system, and oudine the
reasons that an opt-in system is good public policy with respect to
protection of our most personal information.
A. Defining An Opt-In And Opt-Out System
Opt-in and opt-out are terms that create presumptions. Under
an opt-in system, information will remain private unless a person
consents to its disclosure. Opt-in provides an opportunity for con-
sumers to weigh in-to say "yes"-before their information isS 227
shared. By contrast, under an opt-out system, information may
be shared and made public unless a person instructs the entity to
keep it confidential. An opt-out system allows unlimited sharing of
private information unless and until a consumer says stop.
228
Conservative commentator William Safire describes the difference
between opt-in and opt-out as "the difference between a door
locked with a bolt and a door left ajar."
29
225. Id.
226. In articles and testimony in front of legislators, opponents have claimed
that privacy legislation will raise the price of financial services, reduce the availabil-
ity of credit, and interfere with a person's ability to make purchases with a check.
Cate, supra note 173, at 17 (claiming severe economic hardship). They fail to
mention that the State of South Dakota has had an "opt-in" law for banks for over
fifteen years and has experienced no difficulty with the system.
227. Hatch, supra note 171.
228. Id.
229. William Satire, America Hasn't Gone Far Enough to Protect Privacy Rights, STAR
TRIB., Sept. 26, 1999.
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B. The Inherent Problems With An Opt-Out System
There are three fundamental problems with an opt-out system
that undermine its ability to adequately protect an individual's pri-
vacy interests concerning the treatment of sensitive personal in-
formation. First, a successful opt-out system is conditioned upon
individuals being able to understand how companies are using
their personal information. Second, a successful opt-out system is
conditioned upon individuals getting meaningful notice that they
have a right to opt-out of this information sharing. Third, a suc-
cessful opt-out system is conditioned upon consumers being able to
effectuate their preference without undue convenience. An opt-
out system cannot operate effectively because there is no true indi-
vidual control over the exchange of personal information.
1. Consumers Do Not Understand How Personal Information Is
Being Disclosed
The secrecy surrounding how personal consumer information
is used by commercial entities limits the potential for consumers to230
act. Companies routinely fail to disclose the manner in which
they use sensitive information. Unless an individual notices an un-
authorized charge or some other irregularity, the information shar-
ing will continue indefinitely regardless of the individual's desire to
keep that information private. Even companies that provide some
notice of their information-sharing practices typically fail to dis-
close who will receive the information, how it will be used, whether
the information will be merged with another databased or net-
worked information, and the manner a company may use to solicit
a consumer whose information has been shared.
In addition, the opt-out notice is usually surrounded by confus-
ing and misleading information that prevents individuals from un-
derstanding how their personal information may be disclosed. For
example, in the spring of 2000, The New Yorker, a national maga-
zine, sent a lengthy, forty-four question survey to "loyal" or "pre-
ferred subscribers." The questionnaire sought information about
everything from subscribers' shopping habits to their medical ail-
ments, on grounds that the magazine wanted "to maintain an open
230. William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals' Rights in Personal
Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 951, 963 (1996) (stating that "secrecy surround-
ing how personal consumer information is used limits the potential for consumer
action .... ").
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dialogue with our subscribers." Among other things, the magazine
publisher asked subscribers if they were clinically depressed,
menopausal, overweight, used birth control, had menstrual pain,
gastritis or nail fungus. In the cover letter asking subscribers to re-
turn the survey, The New Yorker stated that this personal information
would be shared with "select advertisers," but failed to identify
those "select advertisers," what criteria is used to select the advertis-
ers, or the scope of its so-called "Preferred Subscriber Network."
Faced with a company's incomplete, inadequate or deceptive de-
scriptions of its information-sharing practices, consumers are left
with little opportunity to exercise meaningful, informed consent to
opt-out of such collection or sharing.
2. Consumers Are Not Given Meaningful Notice That They Have
The Right To Opt-Out
Many Americans are unaware that they have a right to opt-out,
and companies make a weak effort to give notice of that right.23'
The failure of an opt-out system is demonstrated by a comparison
of the vast number of individuals who want to protect their privacy
with the small number of individuals who actually opt-out. For ex-
ample, Bank of America's response rate to its opt-out notice is
0.2%, even though most public opinion polls suggest that upwards
of 60-80% of individuals do not want their financial information
disclosed.232  Of the 195 million Americans solicited by Acxiom
Corporation, fewer than 300 people had opted-out by the end of
1997. Although banks, telemarketers, and Internet companies
claim that these opt-out notices provide consumers with a "choice,"
such opt-out systems are plainly ineffective and far from actual
"consent.", 234
An opt-out system encourages businesses to use misleading or
231. Id.
232. Barbara A. Rehm, B of A Chief: Privacy Shields Harm Customers, AM. BANKER,
May 3, 2000; see also Richard A. Barton, Testimony at the Financial Privacy Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of
the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 21,
1999) (stating that less than three percent of the U.S. population utilizes the Di-
rect Marketing Association's opt-out system).
233. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Data Firms Getting Too Personal?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1998, at AO1.
234. Safire, supra note 165 (stating that "The word choice is used by banks,
hospitals, and Internet companies to conceal their intrusions into the personal
lives of their consumers.").
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vague privacy policies hidden in the fine print of a policy agree-
ment or contract.
At present, businesses have little incentive to disclose to con-
sumers how their personal information is used or that they can opt-
out of its use. As a result, the current system produces inefficient
results. A change in the default rule [to an opt-in] gives businesses
an incentive to make disclosures and increases the likelihood that
an efficient market will result.235
A typical opt-out notice has been described as something that
you need "the eyes of an eagle" and "a law degree" to find and un-236
derstand. Typically, the opt-out is placed in the "fine print with
other boilerplate terms." 3 ' Consumers do not take advantage of
opt-out opportunities because they often do not know they can opt-
out, even if they are generally aware of the information sharing
practices of the company.
3. Opt-Out Systems Currently Utilized Impose Cumbersome
Procedures Upon The Consumer
The amount of time, inconvenience, and cost of exercising an
opt-out right is substantial." 8 For example, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) has found that subscription rates for
different telephone maintenance plans are highly correlated to
whether or not the seller used an opt-out system. When telephone
companies obtained affirmative consent for optional maintenance
telephone plans, about 45% of consumers selected the product,
but when the telephone company used an opt-out the number of
consumers who "selected" the product nearly doubled. Cable
companies in the United States and Canada have also had similar
experiences with the opt-out system when selling premium cable
channels, with the number of people being billed for additional
services 30% higher than if the company was required to obtain af-
239firmative consent.
235. Sovern, supra note 108, at 1104-05.
236. Robert K. Heady, Don't Let Anyone Sell Your Privacy, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Oct. 3,1999.
237. David J. Klein, Keeping Business Out of the Bedroom: Protecting Personal Privacy
Interests from the Retail World, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 391, 398
(1997).
238. Sovern, supra note 108, at 1075.
239. Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing 36
AM. Bus. L.J. 377, 384 (1999); see also Dennis D. Lamont, Negative Option Offers and
Consumer Service Contracts: A Principled Reconciliation of Commerce and Consumer Protec-
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In short, "[p]eople are too pressed in their daily routines to
initiate, lead, or otherwise control most consumer contracting."
240
An opt-out system places a cumbersome burden on consumers to
inform a company that they do not want personal information
shared, which they reasonably expect should remain confidential,
when the burden should rest with the company to obtain consum-
ers' consent before disclosing highly personal information.
C. An Opt-In System Follows A Basic Premise Of Contract Law
Concerning "Acceptance" Of An "Offer"
The right to privacy has alternatively been described as the
"right to be let alone," "the right to individual autonomy," and "the
right to a private life.", 4' Underlying each of these definitions is the
desire of the consumer to control access to and use of personal in-
formation. 24' The most effective method of protecting an individ-
ual's right to privacy is a system that recognizes an individual's abil-
ity to contract with companies as to how sensitive personal
information, such as financial records, telephone records, and the
like, will be maintained.
An opt-out system is a negative-option approach to contract
law which undermines a fundamental concept of contract forma-
tion under the common law-that silence does not equal con-
sent. 243 A contract requires both an offer and acceptance. 244 As-
suming that consumers consent by their silence violates the
245consumer's autonomy and freedom to contract. An opt-out sys-
tem transforms silence into acceptance of a company's information
sharing practices, contrary to the accepted norms of contract law.
2 46
1. An Opt-In System Offers The Consumer A Meaningful
Opportunity Of "Selection"
An opt-in system offers consumers the legitimate opportunity
to affirmative consent. 24 It requires that the company give mean-
tion, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1315, 1330 (1995).
240. Bowal, supra note 239, at 378.
241. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 21 (1997).
242. SENATE, supra note 115, at 12.
243. Bowal, supra note 239, at 389.
244. Lamont, supra note 239, at 1350.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1351.
247. Safire, supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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ingful notice, and perhaps even pay consideration, for the use of
the customer's name and data. By opting-in, the consumer has
meaningfully contracted with the company concerning the private
data. With affirmative consent, individuals are afforded a proce-
dural safeguard which gives the consumer control over their data.24
2. An Opt-In System Is Consistent With Consumers' Reasonable
Expectations Of Privacy
The surveys cited earlier make it clear that consumers do not
reasonably expect that the information they provide to facilitate a
loan or credit card transaction will be collected and later shared
with other commercial entities. This is a secondary use of informa-
tion beyond the reasonable expectations of consumers who provide
the information for a different primary purpose. An opt-in system
is consistent with these expectations, as it requires commercial enti-
ties to obtain consent before information is shared for secondary
uses.
A banking opt-in law does not interfere with transactions initi-
ated by the customer, such as writing a check, applying for a loan,
249or using money from an ATM machine. Indeed, depository and
ATM account agreements already require the customer to opt-in
because the customer agrees that such information may be
shared.2 50 However, if a company wants to use information beyond
servicing a customer's request, for whatever reason, then it should
explain such information-sharing practices in the depository ac-
count agreement. If businesses have worthwhile reasons for dis-
closing a customer's personal records for secondary uses, then con-
151sent should not be difficult to obtain. Indeed, there is nothing to
248. An opt-in system does not mean that information may never be shared, it
only means that there should be consent. Once there is consent, then a commer-
cial interest can share information pursuant to that consent. An opt-in system also
has the beneficial effect of providing a business with a list of individuals who are
actually interested in what is being sold.
249. Deron H. Brown, Privacy in the Information Age by Fred H. Cate, 22 T. JEFFER-
SON L. REv. 251, 254 (2000) (book review).
250. Id.
251. Cost is always an issue that is raised with an opt-in system, but these con-
cerns are unwarranted. The picture drawn by most industry representatives is a
mailbox filled with hundreds of notices asking an individual to consent to the
sharing of their information. This picture is incorrect for two reasons. First, a
well-crafted opt-in will not require consent for every transaction. Individuals will
be asked once, and if they grant permission then the consent will last for a specific
period of time. Second, an opt-in will only apply if the commercial entity wants to
2001] 1499
43
Hatch: The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal I
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
prevent a bank from refusing to service the customer if he does not
agree to opt-in to the arrangement. An opt-in provision gives no-
tice to the customer that information collected about them for one
use will be disclosed for a different, secondary use.
3. An Opt-In System Better Balances Bargaining Power Between
Businesses And Consumers
Information sharing is often justified as necessary to provide
an individual with valuable information about quality products and
services. Yet, under an opt-out system, individual consumers are
not allowed to determine for themselves whether the information is
actually valuable or whether the products and services are of high
quality. An opt-in system gives the individual power to control dis-
tribution of their personal information, which in turn increases the
individual's bargaining power by allowing him or her to effectively
set the market price for personal financial or credit information.
In order for the consumer to provide consent, the potential prod-
ucts and services must be of sufficient value to offset the corre-
sponding invasion of the consumer's privacy. Opt-in empowers the
consumer to decide whether waiver of privacy rights is justified by
corresponding benefits of information flow.
4. An Opt-In Allows Businesses To Find Consumers Favorably
Disposed To Marketing
Information allows businesses to focus their resources to avoid
wasteful marketing of products and services to uninterested con-
sumers. An opt-in system identifies a pool of consumers favorably
disposed to such marketing, because individuals demonstrate their
desire to receive marketing materials about specific products by ex-
ercising their right to opt-in. An opt-in system thus improves the
quality of information that does exist, 52 making marketing of
products ultimately more efficient.
Although an opt-out system may increase the quantity of in-
formation in the short-term, over time both the quantity and qual-
253ity of the information may diminish. Individuals will not make a
go beyond the scope of a consumer's reasonable expectations. If a bank or re-
tailer does not share information with non-related affiliates or third parties, then
no consent is required.
252. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic De-
fense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2406-08 (1996).
253. Id. at 2408.
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purchase or apply for a job, credit, or insurance because they do• 254
not want their privacy invaded. Individuals may also provide false
information requested on such applications in order to protect
their privacy.
55
For example, e-mail marketers used to send unsolicited mar-
keting material, dubbed "Spam," to Internet users without their
256consent. That method of marketing has resulted in a backlash
257from consumers, and possible litigation. Internet companies
have now concluded that the best way to market their materials is
through an opt-in system. An industry leader in on-line market-
ing, NetCreations, Inc., discovered that "empowering" consumers
with an opt-in, and then giving them an opportunity to opt-out
every time they are sent a marketing message, is the best method to
maintain customer goodwill and sell products on behalf of compa-
nies like Dell Computer, Compaq, and J. Crew. 259 The opt-in sys-
tem is considered by some Internet marketers to be the "best busi-
ness practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is an immediate need to enact privacy laws governing
the use of personal information such as bank and telephone re-
cords. This need is more acute as deregulation and technology
have allowed institutions to merge, affiliate, and associate such that
massive amounts of highly confidential information may be readily
shared among them. Neither existing laws nor self-regulatory ef-
forts are adequate to protect consumer privacy in the information
age. The lack of protection undermines an individual's right to
privacy and choice.
254. Id. at 2406.
255. Id.
256. Carol Patton, Weaving your e-mail marketing Web: Mass mailing done right can
be golden, but done wrong, it'sjust spam, CRAIN's DETROIT Bus., June 12, 2000, at El.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Internet Marketers Vote In Favor of Opt-In Email: NetCreations Inc. Sponsors Key
Internet Marketing Surveys, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 9, 2000.
260. Id. (stating that "[t] he second poll, an informal survey of attendees taken
at the Direct Marketing Association's (DMA) Internet marketing show in Seattle
last week, also found that marketers overwhelmingly favored opt-in email market-
ing services as the right means to reach consumers."). At the same marketing
show, the DMA's own Association for Interactive Media publicly stated its prefer-
ence for opt-out as the industry's best practices for email marketing despite the
opinions of its members and evidence to the contrary. Id.
20011
45
Hatch: he Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal I
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
1502 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3
Failing to protect an individual's right to privacy has caused
real economic harm. An opt-in approach for handling such infor-
mation protects against these harms, while recognizing both the
liberty and property interests in personal information. An opt-in
approach is also consistent with consumers' reasonable expecta-
tions and is overwhelmingly favored by the public. Finally, an opt-
in system enhances a consumer's bargaining power and better
hones a business's target marketing consistent with consumers' le-
gal privacy rights.
Consumer outrage over the unregulated, non-consensual trad-
ing of highly sensitive information will continue to mount unless
and until policymakers enact strong privacy legislation. Simply, an
opt-in system for the sharing of sensitive personal information must
be central to those legislative efforts in order to both protect an in-
dividual's privacy and prevent information sharing for secondary
uses without consent.
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